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Abstract:Cross hedging is a way to improve statistical hedge results because of markets’
incompletion. In this framework, several markets instead of just one market, are used to in-
crease the hedger’s ﬁnancial possibilities. In the Anderson-Danthine model (1981), the optimal
hedge in the multivariate case is described and commented, but transaction costs are neglected.
The aim of this note is to suggest a new version of the initial model, in which transaction costs
are now taken into account. In a ﬁrst step, benchmark case is formalized with deterministic
costs. Secondly, we consider stochastic liquidity and statistical links between liquidity levels.
In the ﬁrst case, the intuitive non-optimality is shown as soon as transaction costs are inte-
grated. In the second case, a more general model is suggested and a link is mentioned with
the ”commonality in liquidity” concept.
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1Cross Hedging and Liquidity: A Note
1 Introduction
The problem of transaction costs is very often neglected in the hedging literature. In fact,
references on this issue, old (Telser (1955), Miller (1965), Demsetz (1968), Telser and Hingin-
botham (1977), Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981)) or more recent (Bessembinder
and Kaufman (1997), Locke and Venkatesh (1997), Jouini, Koehl and Touzi (1997), Wang,
Yau and Baptiste (1997), Tse and Zabotina (2001), Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001))
discuss generally about quality or costs only, but no link is made with optimal hedge.
In the Cross Hedging Model from Anderson and Danthine (1981), there is evidently no
consideration about the transaction cost problem. As we can observe in their fourth proposi-
tion:
”(4) In the absence of transactions costs and of a ”perfect hedge”, hedgers will take
advantage of the better risk-return performance associated with simultaneous trades in a mul-
tiplicity of futures contracts”, p 1183.1
Since this seminal work, lots of theoretical and empirical studies have arisen. For instance
agricultural economic studies2, exchange rate studies3, ﬁnancial assets studies 4 or energy stud-
ies5 showed the possibilities of cross hedging. Among these studies, only Brorsen, Buck and
Koontz (1998) allude to implicit transaction costs, those linked to market liquidity.
The aim of this last study is to show that when a choice is possible between two trading
places for near products, hedgers can be conducted to switch as soon as the liquidity diﬀerential
is too high. The methodology consist in estimating the liquidity on the two stock exchanges
considered and integrating these estimations in the proﬁt function of the hedger.6 However
results are not particularly convincing in this case, because of the low diﬀerence between the
two liquidity levels. In this note, we will show that this methodology can be used in the multi-
products case, and therefore modifying the optimal vector of hedging.
This result is, to our sense, fundamental for four reasons:
1. In a perspective of dynamic hedging, where hedge position is at least modiﬁed every day
and often several times a day, transaction costs have an increasing place in the ﬁnancial
budget of the agent.
1Jacoby, Smimou and Gottesman (2003) notice that perfect liquidity hypothesis (and then no transaction
cost) is commonly assumed since the seminal work on portfolio choice from Markowitz (1952,1959) and Tobin
(1958). In this way, the Anderson-Danthine framework is not singular.
2Brorsen, Buck et Koontz (1998), Dahlgran (2000), Veal and Parcell (2000), Coﬀey, Anderson and Parcell
(2000).
3Benet (1990), Broll, Wall and Zilcha (1995), Broll, Wong and Zilcha (1999), Adam-M¨ uller (2000).
4MacCabe and Solberg (2002).
5Woo, Horowitz et Huang (2001), Tunaru and Tan (2002).
6We must note that when transaction costs are estimated, they are considered as ﬁxed and then moments
of higher order are zero.
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2. The liberal wave and the following deregulation have modiﬁed and increased the hedging
needs of ﬁrms (see Tussing and Hatcher (1994)7, because of the risky involved (see Wilson
(2002)8).
3. The high degree of concurrence existing in these ﬁnancial markets, explained by global
information, and arbitrage possibilities.
4. The lack in the hedging theory about transaction costs. As mentioned by Lien and Tse
(2002) in their survey, liquidity issue is not taken into account in no method.
Therefore this paper will integrate implicit transaction costs in the general Anderson-
Danthine model to show that the optimal hedge vector is modiﬁed. In a ﬁrst step we will
adopt a deterministic approach - not far from Brorsen and al. (1995), but in the multivari-
ate cas. Secondly, a stochastic approach will be retained. The aim is here to link portfolio
choice with ”commonality in liquidity” concept from Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001).
Anderson-Danthine’s model and optimal hedge vector
Anderson-Danthine’s model has been elaborated during the post perfect-hedge period9(symbolized
for instance by Hieronymus (1971)). Previous contributions advised to take on the futures mar-
ket an exactly (same absolute value) opposed position than in cash market. Financial models
derived from portfolio theory (Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961)) do not conﬁrm this paradigm,
but they are concentrated on cash and futures simultaneously decision10. Ederington (1979),
Holthausen (1979) and Figlewski (1984) will give an extension to Working’s work on basis risk
(1953), and demonstrate that there is no reason for futures position to have the same absolute
value (but in the opposite sense) than cash position. More than conﬁrming the no-full-hedge
paradigm, Anderson-Danthine will also use a multi-market framework and illustrate the spec-
ulative term of the optimal hedge.
The model is a two-period model (t = 0,1) with only one risky asset, whom prices are
respectively p0 et ˜ p1 in the ﬁrst and second period. Quantity y owned of the risky asset is
considered as a constant during the two periods. We assume n futures markets. Positions for
each futures contract represent the column-vector f. Prices of futures contracts are p0
f et e p1
f
11. Authors do not take into account the necessity for the number of contracts purchased to
be integers. Without loss of generality, we also do not take into account the production cost,
and then the expected proﬁt can be written as follows:
e Π = ˜ p1y − (e p1
f − p0
f)0f (1)
7Authors explained in 1994 that energy ﬁnancial markets have no interest in a monopoly situation. Future,
with deregulation, will conﬁrm the increasing interest of ﬁrms for hedging
8Following the author, absence of eﬃcient futures markets could explain, in a part, California collapse.
9Full-hedge or routine-hedge are also used.
10See also Rolfo (1980) and Paroush and Wolf (1986).
11Tilde always mention random variables.
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We assume a risk-averse decision-maker with a mean-variance utility function (see Eich-
ner and Wagener for the link between mean-variance utility and general expected utility func-
tions).
Remark 1 Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (1983,1984) showed that mean-variance analysis can
be reduced to a variance minimization analysis in the unbiasedness case (conditions are dis-
cussed in Cecchetti, Cumby and Figlewski (1988) or Lence (1995)). In this case, there is no
beneﬁt opportunity for exchanging futures contracts because of the perfect equality between spot
and futures prices at the end of the hedge operation. But this case is an exception, occur-
ring when hedge ﬁnishes exactly at the futures contract date (see Bryis, Crouhy et Schlesinger
(1993)).
However, in the multi-product case there is absolutely no reason to assume unbiasedness,
as mentioned by Brorsen and al. (1998), p 450):”All hedges are cross hedges to some degree
because of diﬀerences in grades, location, and time”. Therefore a mean-variance utility function
will represent decision-maker preferences:
U(e Π) = E(e Π) −
1
2
αV (e Π) (2)
with α risk-aversion coeﬃcient in the Arrow-Pratt sense and proﬁt as mentioned in (
Hedge optimization problem conduct then to maximize utility with f as the multi-






αV (e Π)] (3)






with var( ˜ p1) = σ00, Σ10, the column vector of covariances between spot price and futures
prices,
Σ01, the transposed and Σ11, the variance-covariance futures prices matrix.




f − ¯ p1
f) − α(Σ11.f − y.Σ10) = 0 (4)
If Σ11 is not singular, we can calculate the unique optimal hedge vector for a ﬁxed
production y:
12Second order condition is satisﬁed because of the concavity of the utility function.






f − ¯ p1
f) + y.Σ−1
11 Σ10 (5)
This ﬁrst step is not a global optimization process, but a second-best decision. In fact,
production is ﬁxed, and integrated as an exogenous variable in the model. However this process
is not marginal in economics, where hedging decisions are often taken in a second step, because





f − ¯ p1
f), or the pure speculative component (corresponding to the y = 0 case)
2. y.Σ−1
11 Σ10, or the pure hedge component, varying with the production value
The pure speculative component is a classical optimal fund as described in the portfolio
choice theory. This component is a part, inversely related to the risk-aversion coeﬃcient, of
the optimal fund (constructed with all necessary futures contracts). There is no need to own
physical goods to desire the optimal fund and then this fund is also desired by speculators. The
pure hedge component corresponds to a minimization-variance part, as proposed for instance
by Ederington (1979), but in the multivariate case.
The original Anderson-Danthine model gives then optimal hedging decision when there
is no forward contract available. For authors, it is then logical to consider several futures
contracts because: ”However, many cash goods do not have obvious futures. In these cases a
”cross-hedge” may attempted by taking position in a futures for a related commodity” (p 1187).
The considered cost is the sum of implicit costs (liquidity and microstructure characteristics)
and explicit costs (taxes, commissions...).
2 Deterministic transaction costs
The question is whether optimal hedge vector is modiﬁed when transaction costs are integrated
in the analysis? In this section, we consider transaction costs as exogenous. Their value is
known for each futures contract. We also consider a unique transaction cost at the ﬁrst period
instead of two costs for two periods.13
Liquidity issue is perhaps the most broad topic of modern ﬁnance. More than a ﬁnancial
markets characteristic, liquidity is simply the essence of markets, their reason to exist. For
Orl´ ean (1999), liquidity is not an intrinsical property of the asset, as the fundamental value.
Liquidity is a human invention, product of the organized markets concept14. Further its na-
ture, liquidity measure is also a discussable issue. A general way to evaluate liquidity is to
13Note that a rigorous analysis should consider two diﬀerent costs, the ﬁrst for the entry [resp., the exit], the
second for the exit [resp., the entry]. But without loss of generality, we can consider just a unique average cost.
14Le pouvoir de la ﬁnance, p 32.
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estimate the bid-ask spread for the asset. Half of this spread represents (implicit) transaction
costs. A presentation of the principal models of bid-ask spread evaluation15 can be found in
O’Hara (1995)16 and Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997)17.
Let TCspot be the total transaction cost on the spot market and TC
f
i be the transaction
costs on the n futures markets. Proﬁt can be rewritten:
e ΠTCdet = ( ˜ p1 − TCspot)y − (e p1
f − p0
f − TCf)0f (6)
With an identical utility function than in the original model, FOC-vector and optimal




f + TCspot − ¯ p1






f + TCspot − ¯ p1
f) + y.Σ−1
11 Σ10 (8)
This result, if not very diﬀerent from the original one, at a ﬁrst sight, leads to several
remarks which constitute a ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 In the case of deterministic transaction costs:
1. Transaction costs on spot market have no inﬂuence on the pure speculative part of the
optimal hedge.
2. Optimal speculative fund is modiﬁed and become Σ−1
11 (p0
f + TCspot − ¯ p1
f).
3. Optimal hedge vector is modiﬁed due to the Σ−1
11 matrix.
Beyond the intuition of non-optimality when transaction costs are not taken into ac-
count, we can now observe the transformation mechanism of the optimal hedge vector by the
Σ−1
11 matrix. The ﬁrst item of the proposition explains that spot market transaction costs have
just an inﬂuence on the ex ante production decision. In commodities markets, the possibility
of diﬀerences between liquidity levels are non-negligible. Often, near commodities are quoted
in several markets, and some of them are obviously more liquid than others.
This ﬁrst result is a conﬁrmation of the empirical work due to Brorsen and al. (1998).
It conﬁrms that part of the hedge can be transferred in another exchange place because of
transaction costs diﬀerential. Let us examine consequences of liquidity considered henceforth
as a random variable.
15We can cite Roll (1984), Glosten (1987), Stoll (1989), George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1993), and the general
model of Roomans (1993), which is a generalization of its predecessors.
16Market Microstructure Theory.
17Microstructure des march´ es ﬁnanciers.
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3 Stochastic transaction costs
In the last section, we show that hedging behavior is modiﬁed when a liquidity constant term
is included in the analysis. But we are not nearer of the truth. Recent econometric studies
showed that a time-varying formalization for liquidity gave more satisfying results (see for
instance Engle and Lange (1997)18 or Watanabe (2003)19). Our aim here, is not to formalize
liquidity but just to examine consequences of liquidity randomization.
Let now transaction costs, as described in last section, be g TC
f20. Proﬁt can then be
written:
e ΠTCsto = ˜ p1y − (e p1
f − p0
f − g TC
f
)0f (9)
Remark 2 This time we do not take into account neither production costs nor transaction
costs on spot market. In a dynamic hedging perspective, these costs are negligible compared
to futures markets transaction costs. In addition, our interest in this paper is not on relation
between futures position and physical or cash position.
Expected proﬁt (




V (e ΠTCsto) = V ( ˜ p1y) + V [p0
f + g TC
f
− e p1
f)0f] + 2cov( ˜ p1y,p0




We now introduce (n+1,n+1) variance/covariance transaction costs matrix, constructed






with var( ˜ p1) = σ00,
TC10, the n column vector of covariances between spot price and transaction cost on
each futures market,
TC01, its transposed, and
TC11, the (n,n) variance/covariance transaction costs matrix.
18Engle R. and Lange J., Measuring, Forecasting and Explaining Time Varying Liquidity in the Stock Market,
NBER Working Paper no. 6129.
19Watanabe M., A Model of Stochastic Liquidity, Yale Working Paper no.03-18.
20A n column-vector.
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We also construct the (n,n) covariance matrix, representing statistical relation between
futures prices and transaction costs:
Q = [cov(g TC
f
i ), e pj
f]





f − ¯ p1
f] − α[(TC11 + Σ11 − Q).f + y.(TC10 − Σ10)] = 0 (12)






f − ¯ p1
f] + yZ−1(TC10 − Σ10) (13)
with Z the (n,n) matrix deﬁned by: Z = TC11 + Σ11 − Q and supposed non-singular.
Proposition 2 With stochastic transaction costs, behavior which do no take into account co-
variance between diﬀerent liquidity levels is quasi-surely non-optimal. The optimal hedge vector
is given by fTCsto = 1
αZ−1[p0
f + TC
f − ¯ p1
f] + yZ−1(TC10 − Σ10).
This proposition refers to the well-known diversiﬁcation concept from Markowitz (1952).
By this way, it is shown that the optimal hedge vector is not modiﬁed uniquely by transaction
cost values, but also by statistical relation between this values. Each asset is in fact considered
as the sum of two random variables, whom relationships must be integrated in the analysis.
4 Concluding remarks and extensions
Since Markowitz (1952) and his diversiﬁcation principle, neglect covariances is not more than
an abberation. In addition than demonstrating that transaction costs have a real eﬀect on
optimal hedging, we show that randomization brings even more complexities in the analysis.
Very often, transaction costs are a really minor part of total costs, but in particular cases,
as for instance in emerging markets, they are not. On these markets, liquidity diﬀerentials
are remarkable and then logical arbitrages must be done. Cross-hedging is a manner to do
arbitrage trading.
A relevant concept in ﬁnancial literature for our analysis is the ”commonality in liquidity”
due to Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001). The authors establish the concept of market
liquidity, comparable with the market return of the CAPM framework. Proper liquidity is
then evaluated for each asset, and compared to market liquidity, exactly as the well-known
coeﬃcient β of Sharpe (1964). A link with this theory could represent one particular interesting
extension to this note.
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